Constitutional Court confirms constitutional legitimacy of Article 25(3) of Legislative Decree 148\/2015 on the sanctioning of late submission of the CIGS application<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Case ref: Constitutional Court judgment no. 90 of 15 May 2020<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge of the constitutional legitimacy of Article 25(3) of Legislative Decree 148\/2015 with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution, with regard to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, is unfounded.\nThis is the conclusion of the Constitutional Court, in its ruling of May 15, 2020, following the referral of the Lazio Regional Administrative Court Order.\nAs is well known, article 25(1) of Legislative Decree 148\/2015 provides that \u00abthe application for extraordinary wage-support scheme (CIGS) is submitted within seven days from the date of conclusion of the trade union consultation procedure or from the date of signing of the company collective bargaining agreement relating to the application for CIGS\u00bb.\nThe following paragraph 3, which is the subject of the Chamber\u2019s examination, provides that \u00abin case of late submission of the application, the treatment starts from the thirtieth day after the submission of the application\u201d, with the further consequence, provided for by paragraph 4, that \u00abif the omission or late submission of the application results in the partial or total loss of the right to wage supplement to the detriment of the workers, the company is required to pay the workers a sum equivalent to the wage supplement not received\u00bb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case that led to the Constitutional Court\u2019s ruling, on the back of a solidarity agreement signed on 1 October 2015, the company filed an application for CIGS on 30 November 2015, i.e. well after the seven-day deadline that had expired on 8 October 2015.\nFaced with this delay, the Ministry of Labour authorized the CIGS only as of 30 December 2015, in application of art. 25(3), of the said Legislative Decree.\nThe company appealed to the TAR, claiming, among other things, that Article 25(3) violated Article 3 of the Constitution \u00abwith reference to the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as it would result in an unjustifiably onerous \u201csanction\u201d for the company submitting the application beyond the seven-day period established by Article 25(1) of said Decree. In addition, the provision is detrimental to Article 3 of the Constitution itself, but with reference to the principle of equality, in that it discriminates against companies (such as the applicant in the main proceedings) who take over service contracts and which must therefore comply with the so-called social clause\u00bb. Those criticisms were held to be unfounded by the Constitutional Court.\nThe Chamber, as a preliminary point, notes the wide discretion enjoyed by the legislature in regulating the matter of social shock absorbers and, specifically, in bringing the related administrative procedures into line \u00abwith the sole limit of the manifest unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the choices made\u00bb. A limit which, according to the Constitutional Court \u201ccannot be considered to have been exceeded in the case in question, also in light of the recognition of the overall structure of the regulations on the subject and their evolution\u00bb.\nIn fact, according to the judgement, the procedure pursuant to Article 25 of Legislative Decree 148\/2015 is aimed at avoiding situations of uncertainty for the workers, the trade unions concerned and the company itself and \u00abIn this sense, the company is required to submit the application as soon as possible, an obligation to which the employer is now called to respond in more rigorous terms, to avoid that its inertia negatively affects the implementation of the interests involved\u00bb.\nThe Constitutional Court goes on to say that the claims of unreasonableness of the provision with reference to the application of penalties even for one day\u2019s delay, as complained of by the Company, appear to be of no merit, given that \u00abevery time a deadline is set, exceeding it, even marginally, in any case produces the effects complained of even if a wider time margin than the seven days provided for in paragraph 1 of the said Article 25 of Legislative Decree no. 148 of 2015 is established\u201d.\nEqually irrelevant, according to the Constitutional Court, is the reference made by the parties to the \u201canguish\u201d of the seven-day period established by the aforementioned paragraph. The term, although limited, according to the Judges \u00abis not, in fact, such as to make it impossible, difficult, or in any case excessively onerous to comply with. This is all the more so when it is considered that the application for the granting of the extraordinary wage-support scheme must be submitted electronically through the CIGS on-line procedure\u00bb.\nOn the basis of the above arguments, the Constitutional Court has therefore declared \u00abthe question of constitutional legitimacy of Article 25(3) of Legislative Decree No. 148 of 2015 as unfounded\u00bb with reference to \u00abArticle 3 of the Constitution in terms of violation of the principles of reasonableness and proportionality\u00bb.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La Corte Costituzionale conferma la legittimit\u00e0 costituzionale dell’articolo 25, comma 3, D. Lgs. 148\/2015 che regola gli effetti della tardiva presentazione della domanda di CIGS Corte Costituzionale, sentenza del 15 maggio 2020 n. 90 La Corte Costituzionale, con la sentenza del 15 maggio 2020 n. 90, ha ritenuto infondata la questione di legittimit\u00e0 costituzionale dell’articolo […]<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1891,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[44],"tags":[],"yoast_head":"\n
A fronte di tale ritardo, il ministero del Lavoro aveva autorizzato la CIGS soltanto a partire dal 30 dicembre 2015, in applicazione dell\u2019art. 25, terzo comma, D. Lgs. citato.
Avverso il provvedimento amministrativo la societ\u00e0 ricorreva al Tar sostenendo, tra l’altro, che il citato comma 3 violasse l’articolo 3 della Costituzione \u00abin riferimento ai principi di ragionevolezza e proporzionalit\u00e0, in quanto comporterebbe una \u201csanzione\u201d ingiustificatamente onerosa per l\u2019impresa che presenti la domanda oltre il termine di sette giorni stabilito dal comma 1 del medesimo art. 25 del d.lgs. n. 148 del 2015. Inoltre, la disposizione sarebbe lesiva dello stesso art. 3 Cost., ma in riferimento al principio di uguaglianza, in quanto opererebbe una discriminazione nei confronti delle imprese (quale \u00e8 la ricorrente nel giudizio principale) che subentrano in appalti e che devono quindi rispettare la cosiddetta clausola sociale\u00bb<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n